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Spatial Asymmetries In Viewing And Remembering Scenes: 
Consequences Of An Attentional Bias?
By: Christopher A. Dickinson and Helene Intraub
Abstract
Given a single fixation, memory for scenes containing salient objects near both the left and right view boundaries 
exhibited a rightward bias in boundary extension (Experiment 1). On each trial, a 500-msec picture and 2.5-sec 
mask were followed by a boundary adjustment task. Observers extended boundaries 5% more on the right than 
on the left. Might this reflect an asymmetric distribution of attention? In Experiments 2A and 2B, free viewing of 
pictures revealed that first saccades were more often leftward (62%) than rightward (38%). In Experiment 3, 
500-msec pictures were interspersed with 2.5-sec masks. A subsequent object recognition memory test revealed 
better memory for left-side objects. Scenes were always mirror reversed for half the observers, thus ruling out 
idiosyncratic scene compositions as the cause of these asymmetries. Results suggest an unexpected leftward bias of 
attention that selectively enhanced the representations, causing a smaller boundary extension error and better 
object memory on the views’ left sides.
Dickinson, C.A., Intraub, H. Spatial asymmetries in viewing and remembering scenes: Consequences of an 
attentional bias?. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 71, 1251–1262 (2009). https://doi.org/10.3758/
APP.71.6.1251. Publisher version of record available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/
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Various asymmetries have been observed in the way in 
which the left and right sides of space are perceived and 
represented. In the case of hemispatial neglect, individuals 
with damage to critical areas of one hemisphere (usually 
in the right parietal lobe) fail to report or respond to infor-
mation on the contralateral side of space (e.g., Behrmann 
& Geng, 2002; Heilman, Bowers, Valenstein, & Watson, 
1987; Heilman & Valenstein, 1972; Kinsbourne, 1970; 
Mesulam, 1981; see, for review, Karnath, Milner, & Val-
lar, 2002). In normal populations, asymmetrical process-
ing has been observed in a number of cognitive tasks. In 
line bisection tasks, observers often show a bias to bisect 
lines to the left of center (referred to as pseudoneglect; 
Bowers & Heilman, 1980; Jewell & McCourt, 2000). A 
bias to begin searching on the left side of a display has 
been reported in conjunction search tasks (Ebersbach 
et al., 1996; Williams & Reingold, 2001; Zelinsky, 1996). 
In the case of reading and eye movements, there is a right-
ward bias in the perceptual reading span for English read-
ers (more letters can be read to the right of fixation than 
to the left) that reverses for readers of languages with the 
opposite reading direction, such as Hebrew (Pollatsek, 
Bolozky, Well, & Rayner, 1981; see Rayner, 1998).
To our knowledge, neither eyetracking nor memory 
research has revealed any asymmetries in scene represen-
tation in normal populations. In the case of the first fixa-
tion on a scene, the lack of a bias toward the left or right 
is not surprising, given that observers tend to fixate the 
most salient objects or locations in a scene (e.g., the ones 
that are most visually conspicuous [Itti & Koch, 2000, 
2001; Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002] or semantically 
informative [Buswell, 1935; Friedman, 1979; Henderson, 
Brockmole, Castelhano, & Mack, 2007; Loftus & Mack-
worth, 1978]). Unlike English prose, visual scenes do not 
have an inherent left–right structure. The same holds true 
for memory for the visual details of a scene; there is no 
a priori reason to expect better memory for objects and 
features on either the left or the right side. This is why we 
were very interested in an unexpected rightward bias in 
boundary extension for a briefly presented view of a scene 
(Intraub, Hoffman, Wetherhold, & Stoehs, 2006).
Boundary extension is a constructive memory error for 
views of scenes in which views are remembered as being 
more spatially expansive than they actually were—as if 
the viewer had seen what would be visible just beyond 
the view’s boundaries (Intraub & Richardson, 1989). It is 
thought to reflect the fact that in the world, a scene sur-
rounds the viewer but can never be seen all at once. Scene 
representation is thought to involve not only the visual 
sensory information observed, but also the spatial context 
of that view within the larger scene (e.g., Dickinson & 
Intraub, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; see Intraub, 
2007). In support of this contention, boundary extension 
does not occur for all types of pictures (e.g., drawings 
of objects on blank backgrounds), but only for those in 
which the background conveys a scene context (i.e., a par-
tial view of an otherwise continuous world; Gottesman & 
Intraub, 2002; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). This 
is further supported by fMRI research (Park, Intraub, Yi, 
Widders, & Chun, 2007) showing that boundary extension 
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In these experiments, the stimuli (color photographs of 
scenes) had to be structured in a somewhat unusual way 
to ensure that the observers would always have two po-
tential saccade targets. All views had to contain a salient 
object near the left and right boundaries—for example, a 
patio with a tricycle on one side and a child’s wagon on 
the other (as is shown in Figure 1). On each trial of the 
control experiment, a picture was presented for 500 msec. 
During this time, the observers were required to main-
tain central fixation (eye movements were monitored). A 
2-sec mask replaced the picture, followed by a test picture 
(a closer or wider view of the same stimulus). Boundary 
adjustment revealed a strong rightward bias; the observers 
remembered having seen farther beyond the right bound-
ary (a 20% shift outward) than beyond the left boundary 
(a 12% shift outward). This surprising bias could not be 
attributed to left–right differences in the composition of 
the pictures, because pictures were mirror reversed for 
half of the observers, to control for this potential factor.
The rightward bias in the “shape” of the spatial rep-
resentation observed in Intraub et al.’s (2006) maintain 
fixation condition might have been a spurious effect. 
However, we thought it raised an interesting possibility. 
Perhaps there exists a subtle bias toward the left side of 
space in the first fixation on a scene. When “all things 
are equal” in terms of the structure of the view (i.e., a 
salient object on each side of the picture) and the action 
plans of the observer (i.e., maintaining fixation), this bias 
can be observed. Thus, we are not interested here in the 
impact of a planned fixation on memory, as in Intraub 
et al. (2006), but in a possible bias that might exist prior 
to visual scanning.
What Might Account for This Asymmetry in 
Boundary Extension?
There are several possible explanations that have been 
examined in relation to observed asymmetries in visual 
perception and attention. One extensively investigated 
explanation involves functional differences between the 
hemispheres. The domains of language comprehension 
and spatial attention provide numerous examples. In lexi-
cal decision tasks, words that reach the left hemisphere first 
(because they were presented to the right visual field) are 
evokes selective responses in the parahippocampal place 
area (PPA) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC )—brain regions 
thought to be specifically related to scene layout and loca-
tion (see Epstein, 2005).
Dependent measures in most boundary extension re-
search do not speak to the issue of asymmetry because 
they involve an overall assessment of area (e.g., ratings of 
whether the test view is the same, closer-up, or more wide-
angle than before [Intraub & Richardson, 1989]; a “zoom-
ing” tool that allows observers to show more or less of the 
picture at test [Chapman, Ropar, Mitchell, & Ackroyd, 
2005]). To date, only a few studies have allowed an assess-
ment of boundary extension at individual boundaries.
Drawing tasks have not revealed any noticeable right-
ward bias in boundary extension (e.g., Intraub & Bodamer, 
1993; Intraub et al., 1998; Intraub & Richardson, 1989), 
and subsequent perusal of observers’ drawings has not 
suggested one. A boundary adjustment task, in which ob-
servers could adjust the boundaries of a window-like ap-
erture to reveal more or less of a real 3-D scene, similarly 
revealed no evidence of a left–right asymmetry (Intraub, 
2004). Intraub et al. (2006) used a similar type of border 
adjustment task to test memory for briefly presented pho-
tographs. In this case, at test, observers used the mouse to 
move each border inward or outward to reconstruct the re-
membered view. No left–right asymmetry occurred when 
they were required to move their eyes; however, a surpris-
ing rightward bias in the boundary error occurred when 
the observers were required to maintain fixation.
The purpose of Intraub et al.’s (2006) research was to de-
termine whether a planned gaze shift would influence the 
amount of boundary extension beyond the to-be- fixated 
side of a photograph (Intraub, 2007; Intraub & Richard-
son, 1989). It did not. Results indicated that boundary ex-
tension was based on the observed space, rather than on 
the expected, upcoming space that a new fixation would 
bring into view. No asymmetrical representation of space 
was obtained when the observers shifted their eyes to the 
left or right in response to a cue (the stimulus was always 
removed before the eyes landed). However, in the one ex-
periment in which observers were required to maintain 
fixation on the center of the scene (the control experi-
ment), the unexpected asymmetry was observed.
Figure 1. Examples of indoor (left) and outdoor (right) scenes used in the three experiments. Note that all the scenes 
were shown in color.
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picture reappeared with the borders either pulled inward, 
revealing less of the picture, or pulled outward, reveal-
ing more. This was done so that the observers would have 
to move borders inward and outward equally often, thus 
avoiding a bias. Eyetracking allowed us to test whether 
the observers were following our instructions to maintain 
fixation and to eliminate trials on which a saccade was 
made. The only major difference between this experiment 
and the original one is that we varied the aspect ratio of 
the pictures so that observers could not rely on memory 
for the rectangular space covered by each picture. (In the 
original experiment, this was accomplished by varying 
the size of the test picture.) Minor differences included an 
increase in the number of trials to 30 and an increase in the 
retention interval from 2 to 2.5 sec.
Method
Participants. A total of 24 University of Delaware undergradu-
ates, fulfilling a requirement for an introductory psychology course, 
participated in the experiment. All reported having normal or 
corrected- to-normal vision and normal color vision.
Apparatus. All the stimuli were presented on a 21-in. flat-screen 
CRT monitor in 32-bit color at a resolution of 1,024  768 pixels 
and a refresh rate of 120 Hz that was driven by a video card with 
128 MB of video memory. Stimulus presentation was controlled by 
a Pentium-based PC running Microsoft Windows XP. The software 
was based on a template program supplied by SR Research Inc., 
written in C, that used Simple DirectMedia Layer (SDL) Version 
1.2.9. We used an EyeLink II video-based eyetracking system to 
collect eye movement data (SR Research Ltd.). Eye position was 
sampled at 500 Hz, the system’s spatial resolution was estimated to 
be less than 0.4º, and head position and viewing distance of 72 cm 
were fixed with a chinrest.
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of a set of 41 digitized color 
photographs of indoor and outdoor scenes with a salient object 
or object cluster on both the left and right sides. Figure 1 shows 
representative indoor and outdoor pictures. Eleven of the pictures 
were used for practice trials; the remaining 30 were used for ex-
perimental trials (12 of these were from the set of pictures used by 
Intraub et al., 2006). The pictures were more wide-angle than the 
stimulus views shown during presentation so that, during the test, 
the observers would have the option of adjusting the boundaries to 
show more or less of the picture than before. On average, stimulus 
views subtended 14.8º  9.9º of visual angle (widths ranged from 
11.2º to 16.4º; heights ranged from 7.0º to 11.7º). Figure 2 shows 
a representative picture, along with its stimulus view and initial 
test views. Initial test views that showed less of the picture than 
the stimulus view (referred to as small-aperture trials) subtended 
1º  1º of visual angle; those that showed more of the picture than 
the stimulus view (referred to as large-aperture trials) subtended 
22.8º  14.6º.
Design and Procedure. A depiction of a trial is shown in Fig-
ure 3. The observers self-initiated each trial while fixating on a 
central fixation cross (this also served as drift correction for the 
eyetracker). After 500 msec, the stimulus view of the picture was 
displayed for a total of 500 msec. A red circle appeared around the 
fixation cross 250 msec after the picture’s onset and remained vis-
ible for 50 msec (to remind the observers to maintain central fixa-
tion). A full-screen noise mask was shown immediately after the 
stimulus for 2,000 msec, followed by a 500-msec blank screen. The 
observers were instructed to maintain central fixation during stimu-
lus presentation and to try to remember the pictures in as much detail 
as possible. They were told that the background and layout of the 
objects were as important to remember as the objects themselves and 
that boundary memory would be tested on each trial.
The blank screen was followed immediately by the memory test. 
Here, the observer’s task was to re-create the initial stimulus view as 
typically identified more quickly and/or more accurately 
than words that are presented to the right hemisphere first 
(e.g., Chiarello, 1985; Faust, Kravetz, & Babkoff, 1993; 
Hines, 1978; Young & Ellis, 1985). In addition, a number 
of studies indicate that the left and right hemispheres are 
involved in processing specific aspects of language (see 
Lindell, 2006; Schmidt, DeBuse, & Seger, 2007). Within 
the domain of spatial attention, patients having unilateral 
lesions in the right hemisphere typically show more pro-
found symptoms of neglect for the contralateral side of 
space than do patients with unilateral lesions in the left 
hemisphere (Bisiach, Cornacchia, Sterzi, & Vallar, 1984; 
Weintraub & Mesulam, 1987; see Bowen, McKenna, & 
Tallis, 1999, for a review). Further evidence from neu-
roimaging studies suggests that the right hemisphere is 
more important than the left hemisphere in directing spa-
tial attention (Coull & Nobre, 1998; Gitelman et al., 1999; 
Nobre, Coull, Frith, & Mesulam, 1999).
Although these, as well as other, lateral asymmetries 
in visual perception have been linked to specific brain re-
gions, we suggest that testing hypotheses based on brain 
function would be premature at this point in our investi-
gation. Instead, we asked whether the rightward bias in 
boundary extension was the result of a spatial attention 
bias. Recently, Intraub, Daniels, Horowitz, and Wolfe 
(2008) demonstrated that attentional allocation can modu-
late boundary extension. They found that boundary exten-
sion was greater when attention was divided in a dual-task 
situation, relative to when observers were attending only 
to the scenes. If more attention were devoted to the left 
side of space than to the right side during the first fixation 
on a scene, this might result in a smaller boundary error 
for the left sides of scenes.
The purpose of these experiments was to determine 
whether the rightward bias in boundary extension ob-
tained after observers had maintained central fixation 
on briefly presented pictures could be replicated using a 
larger stimulus set (Experiment 1) and then, if so, to de-
termine whether this might be caused by a leftward bias 
in the distribution of attention. To this end, in Experi-
ments 2A and 2B, we measured the direction of the first 
saccade away from the center in two free-viewing tasks; 
in Experiment 3, we tested object recognition memory 
for objects appearing on the right and left sides of space. 
If the distribution of attention is biased leftward for these 
balanced views of scenes (salient objects on both the left 
and right), an asymmetry favoring the left side of space 
should be apparent not only in boundary extension, but 
also in free viewing and in object memory as well. More 
specifically, we predicted a smaller boundary error for 
the left sides of the scenes (Experiment 1), a leftward bias 
in initial saccade direction under free-viewing conditions 
(Experiments 2A and 2B), and better memory for visual 
details on the left sides of scenes (Experiment 3).
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate the rightward 
bias in boundary extension. On each trial, stimulus dura-
tion was 500 msec, and after a 2.5-sec masked interval, the 
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(referred to as large-aperture trials), as is shown in Figures 2C and 
2D. At the start of the session, the observers were given 20 practice 
trials to practice maintaining central fixation (each practice picture 
was shown twice: in its normal orientation and mirror reversed). 
The observers were then given 1 practice trial with the boundary 
adjustment task. During practice trials, the eye movement feedback 
followed immediately after the blank interval. Half of the observers 
were shown the photographs in their normal orientations, and the 
other half were shown each photograph’s mirror reversal to control 
for any effects of left–right composition of the photographs. In addi-
tion, initial test view (small vs. large aperture) was counterbalanced 
across observers.
Trials on which the observers reported not recognizing the test 
picture (0.4%) and trials on which the observers failed to maintain 
accurately as possible by using the mouse to move each black border 
outward or inward to reveal more or less of the picture. The program 
created the black borders by superimposing black rectangles on the 
top, bottom, left, and right portions of the test picture. The observers 
then indicated how confident they were about their border placement 
by clicking sure (3), pretty sure (2), not sure (1), or don’t remember 
that picture (0). This was followed by eye movement feedback that 
indicated whether central fixation was maintained during stimulus 
presentation. The next fixation cross was presented immediately 
after the feedback.
On half of the experimental trials, the initial test view revealed only 
a small central portion of the picture (referred to as small- aperture 
trials); on the other half, the initial test view revealed much more 
of the picture than was initially shown during stimulus presentation 
A
C
E
B
D
F
Figure 2. A representative scene and its stimulus view, initial test views, and cut-out objects used for 
the Experiment 3 object recognition test. (A) Wide-angle view showing stimulus view (indicated by dotted 
lines). (B) Stimulus view with black borders. (C) Small-aperture initial test view. (D) Large-aperture initial 
test view. (E) The left-side test object. (F) The right-side test object.
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of 0% change [t(23)  5.04, p  .001]. The critical change 
in border placement on the left and right sides is shown in 
Figure 4, with the 95% confidence intervals around each 
mean. As is shown in Figure 4, a significant rightward bias 
in boundary extension was found: The observers revealed 
significantly more of the right side of the scenes than the 
left side both for small-aperture trials [right vs. left, 8.5% 
vs. 5.5%; t(23)  2.3, p  .05] and for large-aperture tri-
als [right vs. left, 13.8% vs. 6.6%; t(23)  4.1, p  .001]. 
In addition, the observers were fairly confident in their 
border adjustments; mean confidence ratings for small-
aperture trials (1.89) and large-aperture trials (1.97) did 
not differ significantly [t(23)  1.54, n.s.].
As in previous studies, boundary extension occurred 
whether the observers had to move the borders inward 
fixation during stimulus presentation (8.3%) were excluded from 
all the analyses.
Measurement of border adjustments. Percent change in bor-
der position was determined relative to the center of the test picture. 
For example, if the distance from the picture’s center to the left stimu-
lus border was 100 pixels and the distance from the picture’s center to 
the final adjusted position of the left test border was 110 pixels, this 
would be reflected as a 10% increase in the amount of space shown on 
the left side of the picture. Boundary extension for the overall expanse 
of the pictures is expressed as the percent difference in area of the 
adjusted test pictures, relative to the area of the stimulus views.
Results and Discussion
Boundary extension occurred; on average, the observ-
ers revealed 16% more of the scene than had been visible 
in the stimulus. This was significantly greater than a mean 
Fixation
Precue
(250 msec)
Cue
(50 msec)
Postcue
(200 msec)
Mask
(2,000 msec)
Blank
(500 msec)
Test
(Border Adjustment)
Figure 3. A depiction of a trial in Experiment 1. Note that the stimuli did not fill the screen and that the initial 
test view was never identical to the stimulus view.
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eye movement conditions, the region toward which at-
tention was shifted did not show a reduction in boundary 
extension.
This suggests that the leftward bias of attention is a sub-
tle one. In Intraub et al.’s (2006) eye movement conditions, 
the demands of the task (e.g., interpreting the cue, select-
ing the object, launching the saccade) may not have been 
conducive to selecting and retaining the types of relational 
details that might help attenuate boundary extension. Al-
ternately, it may be that the task of maintaining attention 
versus making a saccade in a response to a directional cue 
might draw on different aspects of attention (e.g., distrib-
uted in the case of maintaining fixation and attempting to 
memorize the scene vs. focal in the case of launching a 
saccade to fixate a specific object). Distributed attention 
(while maintaining fixation) might be more conducive to 
encoding relational aspects of the stimulus that serve to 
attenuate boundary extension in memory.
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
Perhaps the rightward bias in boundary extension re-
flects a leftward bias in the initial distribution of atten-
tion during observers’ initial fixations on pictures. On the 
basis of the obligatory coupling between covert attention 
shifts and saccades (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Hoffman 
& Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Bla-
ser, 1995; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986), it is pos-
sible that the eyes might be “drawn” to the side of space to 
which attention is biased. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we 
therefore asked whether we would find a corresponding 
leftward bias in the direction of observers’ initial saccades 
when they viewed the pictures. To explore this question, 
we presented the same pictures in the same order as in 
Experiment 1, allowed free viewing, and monitored eye 
movements.
The critical question was whether there would be an 
overall leftward bias in the direction of the first saccade 
or whether its direction would be determined by idiosyn-
crasies of individual pictures. Again, pictures were mir-
ror reversed for half of the observers in order to ensure 
that any biases in initial saccade direction were not caused 
by idiosyncrasies of the pictures. If the observers were 
biased to initially attend to the left side of the pictures, 
we should observe a corresponding bias in initial saccade 
direction. In Experiment 2A, each picture was presented 
for 500 msec, as in the previous experiment. In Experi-
ment 2B, each picture was presented for 10 sec to deter-
mine whether a bias in initial saccade direction might be 
evident under conditions in which the observers were not 
under demanding time pressure, more like normal free 
viewing.
To avoid biasing the observers’ gaze, the memory test 
was deferred until the end of the sequence. We simply 
sought to determine where people looked first. In Experi-
ment 2A, we gave the observers a brief picture recognition 
test to follow through on our instruction that memory for 
the pictures would be tested. In Experiment 2B, we de-
cided to include a boundary memory test similar to that 
[mean increase in area, 11%; t(23)  3.64, p  .005] or 
outward [mean increase in area, 22%; t(23)  5.21, p  
.001] when they re-created their remembered views. As 
in other experiments, however, ultimate boundary place-
ment yielded more boundary extension when the initial 
test view showed more than the stimulus view than vice 
versa [t(23)  3.41, p  .005; Chapman et al., 2005; In-
traub et al., 2006]. This difference is thought to be due 
either to an anchoring effect or to a weak representation of 
extended space being activated when the wider angle test 
views (large-aperture trials) are seen.
It should be noted that factors affecting individual sides 
of a view in boundary extension are just beginning to be 
explored. As was described earlier, no asymmetries were 
previously noted in drawings (e.g., Intraub & Richard-
son, 1989) or in border adjustment tasks conducted in real 
3-D space (Intraub, 2004). In addition, a left versus right 
asymmetry did not occur in the eye movement conditions 
in Intraub et al. (2006) when observers were cued to fixate 
an object on the left or right, 250 msec into a 500-msec 
exposure. The asymmetry that occurred in their control 
experiment (when observers simply maintained fixation), 
and that we have now replicated, was unexpected.
Why might this asymmetry in boundary extension have 
occurred? As was suggested earlier, one possibility is that 
there is a subtle bias in the distribution of spatial attention 
toward the left side of space during the first fixation on 
a scene, prior to the onset of a focal attention shift. This 
bias may have enhanced detail retention on the left side of 
the picture, which served to attenuate the boundary exten-
sion error on that side, as compared with the right side. 
“All things being equal” (salient objects on both sides of 
the picture; observer maintains fixation on the center), 
this bias was observed. This qualification appears to be 
a very important one because, when focal attention was 
manipulated via a directional cue in Intraub et al.’s (2006) 
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Figure 4. Mean percent change in left and right border posi-
tions for small-test-aperture trials and large-test-aperture trials 
in Experiment 1. All error bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals. Means significantly greater than zero indicate boundary 
extension.
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number of pictures in the presentation sequence, we required that at 
least 70% of an observer’s trials meet the saccade latency criterion 
for his or her data to be included in the analyses. This resulted in 
the exclusion of the data from 5 of the initial observers; their data 
were replaced with data from 5 additional observers (1 of whom had 
fewer than 50% valid trials and whose data were not included in any 
analyses). The saccade latency criterion resulted in the exclusion of 
7.5% of initial saccades from the remaining 23 observers.
Results and Discussion
In general, the observers showed a striking leftward 
bias in initial saccade direction in both Experiment 2A 
[left vs. right, 63% vs. 37%; t(23)  4.45, p  .001] 
and Experiment 2B [left vs. right, 62% vs. 38%; t(22)  
3.57, p  .005]. In Experiment 2A, initial saccade laten-
cies were shorter for leftward saccades than for rightward 
saccades [left vs. right, 240 vs. 278 msec; t(23)  4.35, 
p  .001], but initial saccade amplitude did not differ as 
a function of initial saccade direction (left vs. right, 3.21º 
vs. 3.24º; t  1). In Experiment 2B, there were no signifi-
cant differences in initial saccade latency [left vs. right, 
281 vs. 330 msec; t(22)  1.45, n.s.] or amplitude (left 
vs. right, 3.55º vs. 3.37º; t  1) as a function of initial 
saccade direction. The leftward bias in initial saccade di-
rection was not due to picture idiosyncrasies, because the 
same pictures were presented mirror reversed to half the 
observers, and in both orientations, the leftward bias for 
the initial saccade occurred in both Experiment 2A (both 
orientations, 63% leftward) and Experiment 2B (original 
orientations, 60% leftward; mirror-reversed orientations, 
63% leftward).
The boundary adjustment test in Experiment 2B yielded 
no difference in boundary extension on the left and right 
sides of the pictures. The mean percent change in border 
position for the left and right borders and the 95% confi-
dence intervals around each mean are shown in Figure 5. 
In addition, the observers were fairly confident in their 
border adjustments; mean confidence ratings for small-
aperture trials (2.10) and large-aperture trials (2.06) did 
not differ significantly (t  1). Thus, the rightward bias 
in boundary extension observed in memory for these pic-
tures in Experiment 1 did not occur when the observers 
could shift fixation (and attention) over the course of sev-
eral seconds during presentation and memory was tested 
at the end of the sequence. As in Intraub et al. (2006), the 
rightward bias in boundary extension occurred only when 
the observer maintained fixation on a briefly presented 
picture, suggesting an underlying bias in the distribution 
of attention prior to the onset of visual scanning. Taken to-
gether with the single-saccade conditions in Intraub et al. 
(2006), these data suggest that (1) the time frame for such 
a biased representation of a view is very brief (it may be 
available only prior to the onset of a focal attention shift) 
and (2) a focal attention shift eliminates the bias, even 
when the shift is leftward (which might be expected to at 
least maintain the bias).
Pursuant to our hypothesis, however, the present ex-
periment clearly revealed a leftward bias in initial saccade 
direction. This suggests that when pictures were first pre-
sented, the observers’ attention was distributed unequally, 
in Experiment 1 to determine whether, as in Intraub et al. 
(2006), the rightward bias would be eliminated if the ob-
servers moved their eyes during presentation. We tested a 
subset of the pictures, chosen by selecting the 11 pictures 
that had revealed the greatest rightward bias in Experi-
ment 1. To make study conditions as comparable as pos-
sible among the three experiments (at least within the first 
fixation), the observers were given the same instructions 
for studying the pictures as in the previous experiment.
Method
Participants. A total of 24 University of Delaware undergradu-
ates from the same population as that in Experiment 1 participated 
in Experiment 2A; 29 undergraduates from the same population par-
ticipated in Experiment 2B. None had participated in the previous 
experiment.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus was the same as in Ex-
periment 1. The stimuli were selected from the same pool of pictures 
as in the previous experiment. For pictures shown in the previous 
experiment, stimulus views were identical to the views shown in that 
experiment. For the remaining pictures, stimulus views were within 
the same size range. There were 44 stimuli in Experiment 2A and 
34 stimuli in 2B. Four additional pictures were used for the practice 
trials.
Design and Procedure. The observers self-initiated each pic-
ture in the presentation sequence while fixating on a central fixa-
tion cross. After 500 msec, the stimulus view of the picture was 
displayed for a total of 500 msec in Experiment 2A and for 10 sec 
in Experiment 2B. In both cases, the stimulus picture was followed 
by a noise mask for 2,000 msec and a 500-msec blank screen. The 
next fixation cross appeared at the end of the blank interval. As in 
Experiment 1, the observers were instructed to study each picture 
for a subsequent memory test and were told that the background and 
layout of the objects were as important to remember as the objects 
themselves. In Experiment 2A, the observers viewed 40 pictures, 
which included the 30 experimental pictures from Experiment 1 and 
10 additional pictures from our stimulus set. In Experiment 2B, the 
observers viewed only the 30 experimental pictures from Experi-
ment 1 in order to allow us to examine whether any biases in initial 
saccade direction would be found in the identical set of pictures 
that yielded the rightward bias in boundary extension found in the 
previous experiment.
After the observers had viewed the presentation sequence, they 
were given the instructions for the memory test. In Experiment 2A, 
the observers were given a brief picture recognition test, simply to 
follow through on the instruction that memory for the pictures would 
be tested. In Experiment 2B, the observers were given a border ad-
justment test. They were tested on the 11 pictures that had yielded 
the largest rightward bias in boundary extension in Experiment 1, 
and after each border adjustment, they indicated their confidence 
with the same four-choice scale as that in Experiment 1. As in the 
previous experiment, photograph orientation (normal vs. mirror re-
versed) and initial stimulus view (large aperture vs. small aperture) 
were counterbalanced across observers. At the start of the session, 
the observers in each experiment were given four practice trials.
Data inclusion criteria. Data from several studies suggest that 
at least 150 msec is required to program and initiate a saccade (see 
Rayner, 1998). Thus, it would be unlikely that a saccade initiated 
sooner than 150 msec after stimulus onset could be influenced by 
pictorial information. We therefore analyzed eye movement data 
from only trials on which the initial saccade was initiated at least 
150 msec after stimulus onset.
In Experiment 2A, we included all 24 observers in the initial sac-
cade analyses, because of the large number of pictures; however, we 
excluded 24% of the initial saccades on the basis of the saccade la-
tency criterion (with individual observers having between 43% and 
95% valid trials). In Experiment 2B, however, because of the smaller 
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better than nonfixated objects in a scene (Henderson & 
Hollingworth, 1999; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; 
Irwin & Zelinsky, 2002). A null effect would be difficult 
to interpret, but a difference favoring the left would pro-
vide converging evidence for a leftward bias of attention.
Method
Participants. A total of 26 University of Delaware undergradu-
ates from the same population as that in the previous experiments 
participated in the experiment. We replaced 2 observers whose per-
formance on the memory test was at the level of chance. None had 
participated in any of the previous experiments.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the 
same as those in Experiments 1 and 2, except for the addition of 
10 new pictures that were added to the series to increase set size to 
40 for the purpose of minimizing the likelihood of a ceiling effect 
in performance on the memory test. They were presented as part of 
the first and last five trials, and memory was not tested for these 
pictures.
Design and Procedure. The observers self-initiated each pic-
ture in the sequence while fixating on a central fixation cross. 
After 500 msec, the picture was shown for 500 msec (with the fixa-
tion cross still visible), followed by a full-screen noise mask for 
2,000 msec and a 500-msec blank screen. The next fixation cross 
appeared at the end of the blank interval. The observers were in-
structed to maintain central fixation while viewing the pictures and 
were told to try to remember each one for a subsequent memory test. 
As in the previous experiments, they were told that the background 
and the layout of the objects were as important to remember as the 
objects themselves. The observers were not informed about the type 
of memory test until all 40 pictures had been shown.
Test items were created as follows. A subset of 20 pictures was 
selected to be tested, and the left-side and right-side objects from 
each were copied onto a homogeneous gray background, as is il-
lustrated in Figures 2E and 2F. In the stimulus views, one object 
was slightly cropped by a boundary in seven scenes, and both were 
slightly cropped in nine other scenes. Because cropped objects look 
odd when taken out of their scene context, test items were taken from 
the wide-angle version of each picture (e.g., Figure 2A). This was 
explained to the observers in the memory test instructions. Distrac-
tor objects were created in the same manner and were taken from a 
separate set of digitized color photographs of indoor and outdoor 
scenes. None of the distractor objects were visually similar to any 
of the target objects, although in eight cases, they shared the same 
basic-level category (e.g., a blue plastic recycling bin with a lid vs. 
a gray plastic trash container).
The test sequence was constructed as follows. One of the objects 
from each picture was presented in the first half of the test sequence, 
intermixed with 10 distractors. Half were objects from the left side 
and half from the right side of the pictures. The other object from 
each picture was presented in the second half of the test sequence, 
intermixed with the remaining 10 distractor objects. The order of ob-
jects in each half was pseudorandom, with two constraints: (1) that 
no more than two left-side targets, right-side targets, or distractors 
could appear in a row, and (2) that two objects from the same picture 
were never presented in the same serial position. The memory test 
was a 60-item yes–no object recognition test in which test objects 
were presented individually in the center of the screen and the ob-
servers indicated whether they remembered seeing the object by 
clicking yes or no with the mouse. The observers indicated their con-
fidence in their decisions after each recognition response by clicking 
sure (3), pretty sure (2), or not sure (1).
The object tested first (left vs. right) and stimulus orientation 
(normal vs. mirror reversed) were fully crossed and counterbalanced 
across observers. At the start of the session, the observers were given 
four practice trials. Trials on which the observers did not maintain 
fixation during stimulus presentation (16%) were not included in 
any analyses.
with a bias to focus more attention on the left side of space. 
As was mentioned earlier, a similar bias in initial saccade 
direction has also been found in challenging visual search 
tasks (Williams & Reingold, 2001; Zelinsky, 1996). This 
leftward bias in initial saccade direction is consistent with 
an attentional modulation explanation of the rightward 
bias in boundary extension observed in Experiment 1. 
Greater focus on the left might result in a slightly more 
veridical spatial representation. In the next experiment, 
we examined whether we could find converging evidence 
for greater attention to the left side of space that would 
influence scene memory.
EXPERIMENT 3
The eyetracking data from Experiments 2A and 2B in-
dicated that, initially, the observers were biased to attend 
to the left sides of the pictures, even though there was 
a salient object on each side and, across observers, the 
same pictures were mirror reversed. This provides sup-
port for the hypothesis that the rightward bias in boundary 
extension observed in Experiment 1 may have been the 
result of a leftward bias in the distribution of attention 
that limited the amount of distortion on that side. In Ex-
periment 3, we sought to find converging evidence for this 
hypothesis, again using briefly presented pictures (as in 
Experiment 1), but using a different measure of attention: 
recognition memory for objects on the left versus right 
side of the pictures.
It is clear that memory for objects in a scene depends 
not only on attention, but also on familiarity and other 
factors that will vary across observers. Our rationale was 
that if attention tends to be biased to the left side of space 
for these stimuli, we might expect to see somewhat bet-
ter recognition performance for objects that appeared on 
that side of space. Object recognition tests have shown 
that fixated (and thus attended) objects are remembered 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Right
Large
Left
Large
Right
Small
Pe
rc
en
t 
C
h
an
g
e
Left
Small
Figure 5. Mean percent change in left and right border posi-
tions for small-test-aperture trials and large-test-aperture trials 
in Experiment 2B. All error bars indicate 95% confidence in-
tervals. Means significantly greater than zero indicate boundary 
extension.
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thirds of first saccades were made to the left sides of the 
pictures. This pattern occurred whether the scenes were 
presented briefly (Experiment 2A) or for relatively long 
durations (Experiment 2B). In Experiment 3, we reasoned 
that if attention were biased leftward, improving boundary 
memory on the left and biasing the direction of the first 
saccade to the left, we should also observe better memory 
for objects that had appeared on the left side of the scene. 
An object recognition memory test confirmed this predic-
tion. Although many factors can influence why a given 
observer will remember a given object, there was a slight 
advantage in object memory for those objects that had ap-
peared on the left sides of the pictures.
We believe that it is important not to overstate the impact 
of this bias. It appears to be quite fleeting. When observ-
ers did not maintain central fixation on a briefly presented 
scene and, instead, launched a single saccade (Intraub et al., 
2006) or made multiple saccades while viewing the scenes 
for multisecond durations (Experiment 2B), no evidence of 
the asymmetry was observed. Although evident in the ex-
periments reported here, in which salient objects appeared 
on both the left and right sides of the scene, we would ex-
pect that it would be readily swamped by more idiosyn-
cratic organizations of salient objects (see, e.g., Henderson 
et al., 2007). The results of Experiments 2 and 3 were as 
unexpected as the original boundary extension asymme-
try that we replicated in Experiment 1. There is no a priori 
theoretical reason to predict a leftward bias when observers 
view balanced pictures such as these. However, the discov-
ery of this bias has provided some new insights, as well as 
raised new questions, about scene representation.
A leftward bias in the distribution of attention provides 
a parsimonious explanation for the three asymmetries we 
report. It appears to affect memory for both bottom-up 
information (physical details about objects present in the 
stimulus) and top-down information (memory for unseen 
regions beyond the boundaries of the view), as well as 
influencing the direction of the observers’ first gaze shift. 
Why the bias would occur remains an open question. It is 
clear, however, that researchers have been wrestling with 
the question of lateral biases for quite some time (e.g., 
Bryden & Rainey, 1963; Heilman & Valenstein, 1985; 
Mishkin & Forgays, 1952). Perhaps the bias is related to 
hemispheric specialization, which has been implicated 
in lateral asymmetries in global versus local processing 
(Delis, Robertson, & Efron, 1986; Martin, 1979; Volberg 
& Hübner, 2004) and language processing (Babkoff, 
Faust, & Lavidor, 1997; Ellis, Young, & Anderson, 1988; 
Leiber, 1976), among others.
Alternatively, the bias may be related to reading direc-
tion (Fecteau & Enns, 2005; Morikawa & McBeath, 1992; 
Pollatsek et al., 1981; Spalek & Hammad, 2005). This sug-
gestion may seem counterintuitive, given that two of the 
leftward biases we observed (a smaller boundary error in 
Experiment 1, better memory for objects in Experiment 3) 
occurred when saccades were not allowed and that read-
ing involves the active execution of saccades. Consistent 
with this suggestion, however, Spalek and Hammad found 
that when observers were instructed to maintain fixation, 
Results and Discussion
We computed A  values for each participant as a com-
posite index of recognition memory, with the false alarm 
rate for both left-side and right-side targets based on the 
same set of distractors. We used A  because it is a nonpara-
metric analogue of d  that is more appropriate for yes–no 
recognition tests (Pollack, 1970; Pollack & Norman, 1964; 
Snodgrass, Volvovitz, & Walfish, 1972). Object recogni-
tion memory was slightly but significantly superior for 
objects that had appeared on the left side of pictures than 
for objects that had appeared on the right side: left-side 
and right-side A  values were .72 and .67, respectively 
[t(23)  2.42, p  .05]. The same pattern was found for 
the hit rates: left-side and right-side hit rates were .56 and 
.47, respectively [t(23)  2.78, p  .05] (the false alarm 
rate was .27). This suggests that the observers’ attention 
was distributed unequally across the pictures, with more 
attention devoted to the left side of space. In addition, the 
observers were fairly confident in their responses: Mean 
confidence judgments for correct responses to left-side 
objects (2.41) and right-side objects (2.36) did not differ 
[t(23)  1.18, n.s.]. The observers were more confident in 
correct responses (2.38) than in false alarms (2.12), how-
ever [t(23)  3.35, p  .005].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three experiments provided converging evidence that 
attention is not evenly distributed across a scene during 
the first fixation. With salient objects on each side of our 
briefly presented photographs and fixation focused on the 
center, we found that both boundary memory (Experi-
ment 1) and object recognition memory (Experiment 3) 
were better for the left sides of scenes than for the right 
sides. In Experiments 2A and 2B, under free-viewing con-
ditions, the direction of the first saccade (away from the 
center of the picture) was leftward on fully 62% and 63% 
of the trials, respectively. These asymmetries cannot be 
attributed to idiosyncratic picture composition, because in 
each experiment for half the observers, the images were 
mirror reversed.
In Experiment 1, the observers adjusted the borders of a 
test picture seconds after viewing each stimulus. A right-
ward bias was observed, thus replicating the unexpected 
asymmetry reported in Intraub et al. (2006). In both exper-
iments, this asymmetry occurred only when the observers 
maintained fixation on the center of a briefly presented 
picture. On the basis of recent research showing that 
boundary extension is greater when attention is divided 
during encoding than when it is focused (Intraub et al., 
2008), we hypothesized that better boundary memory on 
the left might signify a leftward bias in the distribution of 
attention across the scene prior to visual scanning. The 
results of Experiments 2 and 3 supported this hypothesis.
Because spatial attention precedes a saccade (Hoffman 
& Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler et al., 1995), in Experi-
ments 2A and 2B, we sought to determine whether, under 
free-viewing conditions, the observers would exhibit a 
bias to initially look to the left. In both cases, about two 
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tion is bottom up (as in the case of object recognition) or 
top down (as in the case of boundary extension), attention 
serves to enhance the veridicality of what we remember.
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